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1. Introduction
Jonathan Quong’s Liberalism Without Perfection has two connected 
purposes: to reject perfectionism, and to defend a public-justification 
model of political liberalism. Perfectionism, broadly speaking, is the 
view that it is legitimate for us to exercise political power in order to 
promote the leading of truly good lives. Perfectionism therefore rests on 
claims about what constitutes human flourishing, beyond simply avoid-
ing death, pain, and other obvious evils. Perfectionism is not necessar-
ily antithetical to liberalism, for if one’s conception of flourishing gives 
pride of place to values such as autonomy and individuality, one will like-
ly support familiar liberal rights (conscience, speech, education, etc.). It 
is even possible, on the basis of a liberal conception of flourishing, to ar-
gue that the state ought not favour or disfavour other, more specific con-
ceptions of the good. Quong agrees with Thomas Hurka, George Sher, 
Steven Wall and Joseph Chan, however, that attempts to ground neu-
trality on a liberal conception of the good don’t end up being fully neu-
tral, because they must permit gentle, pluralistic perfectionism.1 Unlike 
Hurka et. al., Quong maintains that this lack of neutrality is a problem. 
1  Thomas Hurka, “Indirect Perfectionism: Kymlicka on Liberal Neutrality,” The 
Journal of Political Philosophy 3 (1995): 36-57; George Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Per-
fectionism and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Steven Wall, 
Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint (Cambridge, England ; New York: Cambridge 
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Even if it doesn’t permit violations of basic rights and generally supports 
neutrality, a liberalism grounded in a liberal conception of the good will 
involve paternalism, and such paternalism is inconsistent with recog-
nition of one’s fellow citizens’ moral status as free and equal persons.2 
The main alternative to a liberalism that begins from a liberal theory of 
the good is some form of “political liberalism,” which rules out appeals 
to controversial, i.e. reasonably contestable conceptions of the good as 
the foundation for liberal principles. While acknowledging the exist-
ence of “modus vivendi” and “value pluralist” forms of political liberal-
ism, LWP defends a Rawlsian version of political liberalism based on the 
idea of public justifiability. No one disputes that the exercise of political 
power should have to be justified in public. The Rawlsian principle of 
public justification is distinctive and controversial, however, because it 
holds that the exercise of political power must be justifiable to all those 
subject to that power, where “justifiable to A” means something like 
“would be acceptable to A, if A took the necessary time to think about 
it, without A having to give up the reasonable religious or philosophical 
doctrine A currently espouses.” Justification to each of A, B, C... there-
fore involves a partly idealized unanimity standard, or what following 
David Estlund I will refer to as a qualified acceptability requirement.3 
The exercise of political power must be such as to receive unanimous ap-
proval on the part of all reasonable or otherwise qualified perspectives. 
This idea of unanimous idealized acceptability may be met with scepti-
cism. Who is to say who counts as reasonable? Isn’t it dubious to argue 
that because you would agree with me if you were reasonable I don’t have 
to ask for your consent, and can simply impose my views? As Quong ar-
gues in Chapter 10 of LWP, such objections are wrong-headed, because 
they misunderstand the scope and point of the principle. Of course eve-
ryone gets a say, reasonable or not; everyone gets to vote and run for 
office. The idealized unanimity criterion is not a social decision pro-
cedure intended to replace ordinary democratic processes (based on a 
franchise limited to card-carrying late-Rawlsians). It is a moral principle 
that is meant to identify when and how the exercise of political power 
University Press, 1998); Joseph Chan, “Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, no. 1 (2000): 5-42.
2  Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 23-6, 97-107. Henceforward I will refer to this work as “LWP”, with page 
references in parentheses in the text.
3  David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 3-5, 40-65.
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is legitimate, a principle citizens themselves are meant to apply in de-
ciding how to exercise their democratic rights. Everyone is part of the 
actual voting constituency, but only some are part of the “constituency 
of public justification” (292), the “constituency of reasonable persons” 
(143, 261) to whom the grounds of our political decisions must be unani-
mously acceptable. Perhaps some political liberals are guilty of drawing 
the justificatory constituency too narrowly. Yet those who reject the re-
quirement of public justifiability cannot complain about this, for they 
draw this constituency narrower still. Those who reject public justifi-
ability accept what Steven Wall calls a “correctness” standard of justifi-
cation.4 Correctness justification can be viewed as a degenerate case of 
public justification; it is simply public justification when the circle of 
qualification (the justificatory constituency), is reduced to one. People 
who think that reasons for political decisions don’t have to be acceptable 
to any other points of view, just true, are not in a good position to com-
plain that political liberals require acceptability to too few points of view.
Quong’s version of public justification liberalism is generally Rawlsian, 
but with some important differences. It is Rawlsian first because it re-
quires that political decisions be justifiable in terms of reasons that 
pass the qualified acceptability requirement; it is not the principle that 
state action must pass the qualified acceptability requirement other-
wise we default to inaction.5 In the latter formulation, as a constraint 
on state action directly, the principle of public justification would per-
mit laws that are not justifiable on the balance of public reasons if the 
total balance of reasons of each reasonable comprehensive doctrine fa-
voured the law (although such unanimous convergence is likely to be 
rare). The direct application of the qualified acceptability requirement 
4  Steven Wall, “Is Public Justification Self-Defeating?,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 39, no. 4 (2002): 385-94. A correctness-based justification ‘demonstrates 
that a conclusion is correct, irrespective of whether all persons can reasonably accept 
it’ (386).
5  Here is how Quong put this point in an earlier article: “The standard of liberal 
legitimacy, after all, is not (or should not be) reasonable rejection... Rawls’s standard 
of liberal legitimacy asserts that the state should not act on grounds that citizens 
cannot ‘reasonably be expected to endorse’. There is all the difference in the world 
between these two conditions... As Rawls says, ‘reasonable political conceptions of 
justice do not always lead to the same conclusion, nor do citizens holding the same 
conception always agree on particular issues. Yet the outcome of the vote is to be 
seen as reasonable provided all citizens of a reasonably just constitutional regime 
sincerely vote in accordance with the idea of public reason’;” Jonathan Quong, “Disa-
greement, Asymmetry, and Liberal Legitimacy,” Politics, Philosophy, Economics 4, 
no. 3 (2005), 316; citing John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1996), lvi. The analogous passage in LWP does not contain this state-
ment, but I do not think Quong’s position has changed; see p.210 of LWP.
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to state action would also permit a negative total balance of reasons on 
the part of just one reasonable comprehensive doctrine to trump a posi-
tive balance public reasons (a scenario that is more readily imaginable). 
The idea of public justification via convergence without consensus has 
recently been defended by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier, but Quong 
rejects this model, insisting on Rawls’s shared reasons requirement 
(265-273).6 The second Rawlsian aspect of Quong’s position is that or-
dinary citizens as well as designers of political institutions are to apply 
the principle of public justification. It is conceivable, even if one might 
think unlikely, that we could do better, in terms of the goal of enacting 
publicly justifiable laws, by deliberating and voting on the basis of our 
various comprehensive doctrines, within the context of institutions de-
signed to maximize public justifiability. Again, the model here would be 
Gaus and Vallier’s indirect model of public justification. Quong sticks 
with Rawls’ view that public justifiability is something we should all aim 
for, not just something we should hope ends up happening.
Quong deviates from Rawls in two important respects. Rawls claimed 
that that the principle applied only to (or at least in the first instance to) 
so-called “constitutional essentials” and “matters of basic justice.”7 In 
contrast, Quong believes that the principle applies to all exercises of po-
litical power (273-287). His political liberalism is therefore more broad-
ly antiperfectionist than Rawls’s. Also, the idea of “overlapping consen-
sus” plays a different role in Quong’s theory than it did in Rawls. For 
Rawls, there were two stages of justification. First, we articulate a free-
standing defense of a political conception of justice, one meant to be 
acceptable to all reasonable moral points of view. Then we check to see 
if that conception might become the object of an overlapping consen-
sus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. A number of Rawls’s critics 
took issue with this two-fold structure of justification.8 If the first stage 
6  Gerald F. Gaus, and Kevin Vallier, “The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly 
Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institu-
tions,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 35, no. 1-2 (2009): 51-76. For further discus-
sion of the differences between “convergence” and “consensus” modes of public jus-
tification, see Kevin Vallier, “Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason,” Public 
Affairs Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2011): 261-80 and Andrew Lister, “Public Justification of 
What? Coercion Vs. Decision as Competing Frames for the Basic Principle of Justifi-
catory Liberalism,” Public Affairs Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2011): 349-67.
7  As Quong notes, Rawls’ position is ambiguous; compare Rawls, Political Liberal-
ism, 215; John Rawls, and Erin Kelly, Justice as Fairness : A Restatement (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 91, note 13.
8  See in particular Brian Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” Ethics 105 
(1995): 874-915; Jurgen Habermas, “Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: 
Remarks on John Rawls’s Liberalism,” Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 3 (1995): 109-31.
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argument is correct, all reasonable comprehensive doctrines ought to 
accept the political conception of justice, or some similarly liberal po-
litical conception. Requiring that the political conception of justice (or 
the liberal family of conceptions) receive support from doctrines that 
reject this argument would seem to make the political conception hos-
tage to the unreasonable (167). Quong’s solution is to argue that over-
lapping consensus is the starting point for the freestanding argument, 
not a second-stage test with independent justificatory force. By defi-
nition, reasonable comprehensive doctrines accept certain basic ideas: 
that society is a fair scheme of cooperation, that there are burdens of 
judgment, and thus a fact of reasonable pluralism, and that therefore 
the exercise of political power ought to be publicly justifiable. This con-
vergence of reasonable doctrines on the fundamental elements of polit-
ical liberalism holds because acceptance of the ideas in question is one 
of the criteria of reasonableness. 
Quong therefore insists, rightly in my view, that political liberalism is 
not a theory intended to justify liberalism to the non-liberal. Quong 
distinguishes what he calls the “external” and the “internal” concep-
tions of political liberalism, and defends the latter (138-160). The main 
difference between the two concerns the constituency of public justifi-
cation. The external conception holds that political principles, as well 
as (decisions about) laws and policies, are justifiable to all when they 
are acceptable to all of the real citizens in current societies who are rea-
sonable a weak sense, e.g. being willing and able to reason sincerely and 
live cooperatively with others. Citizens who are reasonable in this sense 
need not share any basic liberal commitments, let alone a commitment 
to the principle of public justification. In contrast, the internal concep-
tion counts as qualified only those points of view that recognize the ex-
istence of burdens of judgment, accept the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
(hence) conceive of society as a fair scheme of cooperation between free 
and equal moral persons (summarizing 140 and 143-4). Fully reasona-
ble points of view also accept the principle of public justification (207), 
a fact that will be important to Quong’s reponse to the so-called “asym-
metry” objection, discussed below. This more highly idealized standard 
of qualification makes the internal view’s account of the justificatory 
constituency more restrictive, and so makes the unanimity requirement 
easier to satisfy than it would otherwise be. At the same time, the in-
ternal model requires acceptability to all possible views that meet these 
criteria, not just the subset of qualified views currently existing in a par-
ticular society. This hypothetical aspect of the internal view broadens 
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the justificatory constituency, making the unanimity standard harder 
to satisfy than it would otherwise be. These differences in the two mod-
el’s standards of qualification reflect deep differences about the purpose 
or point of public justification, I believe. On the external conception, 
with its weak conception of reasonableness and its focus on actually-
existing views, public justifiability is closely connected with stability. 
On the internal conception, with its more strongly idealized and hypo-
thetical constituency, public justifiability is meant to be a consequence 
of respect for persons’ equal moral status, and a way of constituting a 
relationship in which this mutual respect is manifest.
In my comments, I want to focus on the connection between the two 
sides of Quong’s argument, the critical and the positive. I want to ques-
tion whether one needs the principle of public justification in order 
to be a strict anti-perfectionist, and also whether if one does accept 
the principle one will end up being as strictly anti-perfectionist as he 
claims. In short, I want to suggest that public justification is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for a strict anti-perfectionism. I will argue that 
one could be firmly opposed to all perfectionism that involves paternal-
ism, but still reject the requirement of public justifiability, and also that 
one could endorse public justification while permitting perfectionism 
on the basis of claims about the good that are not reasonably rejectable.
2. Two (or more) Questions about the Good
Quong distinguishes two questions about the role of conceptions of the 
good in (liberal) political philosophy:
 “1) Must liberal political philosophy be based in some particular 
ideal of what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or 
other metaphysical beliefs?
 2) Is it permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage some 
activities, ideals, or ways of life on grounds relating to their in-
herent or intrinsic value, or on the basis of other metaphysical 
claims?” (12)
Question 1 distinguishes “comprehensive” from “political” theories, 
while question 2 distinguishes “perfectionism” from “antiperfectionism”, 
yielding four possible views. The two questions differ in their objects, 
first of all: the principles that compose a political philosophy, for ques-
tion 1, as opposed to laws, policies and other state actions, in for question 
2. They also differ in the role played by conceptions of the good: sources 
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of justification, in question 1, as opposed to objects of promotion as well 
as sources of justification, for question 2.9 And they differ finally in the 
nature of the question being asked. Question 1 asks about possibility, 
Question 2 about permissibility. According to Quong, political liberals 
assert and comprehensive liberals deny that liberal principles can be de-
rived from nonliberal religious and philosophical doctrines, as well as 
from liberal ones. I don’t think that is the right way to draw the compre-
hensive-political contrast. One certainly hopes that political liberals are 
right that it is possible to accept liberal political principles on the basis 
of non-liberal religious and moral doctrines, that one does not have to 
be a Millian or a Kantian to accept freedom of conscience, representa-
tive democracy, and other familiar liberal rights. However, there is no 
reason for comprehensive liberals to deny that such broad liberal prin-
ciples are endorsable from multiple points of view. Comprehensive lib-
erals also hope that philosophical liberals and philosophical nonliberals 
will converge on some general set of liberal rights and freedoms. There 
will be disagreement about the specification and ranking of these free-
doms, as well as about which rights are included, and so too about the 
laws, policies, and institutions they require or permit. The comprehen-
sive liberal maintains that in debating and deciding on these matters, 
there is nothing wrong with making up one’s mind based on the full set 
of reasons one accepts, including reasons based on what one takes to be 
truths about human flourishing, even if reasonably contestable. In con-
trast, the political liberal maintains that there is something wrong with 
making these decisions on nonpublic grounds. We all hope that generic 
liberal principles can be accepted by people from diverse backgrounds. 
But if we find ourselves disagreeing about political decisions because 
9  Question 2 refers to promoting activities or ways of life on the grounds of their 
inherent goodness, not just to promotion in general. There are two ways that we 
could promote conceptions of the good without making any claim about their in-
herent goodness. First, we might promote a conception of the good because its 
general adoption would have beneficial consequences unrelated to its goodness, 
consequences such as social stability. Establishing a religion on grounds of avoiding 
religious war would fit into this category. Establishing one religion to avoid civil con-
flict could in principle be an effective policy motivated by the familiar public consid-
eration of maintaining peace; Richard Arneson, “Neutrality and Utility,” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 20, no. 2 (1990): 215-40; Alan Patten, “Liberal Neutrality: A Re-
interpretation and a Defence,” Journal of Political Philosophy 20, no. 3 (2012): 249-72. 
Second, we might find ways of promoting human flourishing that don’t presuppose 
any specific account of what flourishing consists in. One might argue that providing 
education and requiring courses in world religions and philosophies would promote 
the leading of good lives without making any particular claim about what the good 
life is. However, views that answer “yes” to Question 2 permit the promotion of spe-
cific conceptions of the good on grounds of the claim that they are true.
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of religious or philosophical differences that lead us to accept different 
principles of justice or different rights and duties, political liberals claim 
that we must decide on public grounds, while comprehensive liberals 
recognize no such duty of restraint on the part of citizens, nor any fun-
damental criterion of legitimacy involving qualified acceptability. 
We could therefore modify Question 1 to focus on permissibility:
 1b) May liberal political philosophy be based in some particular ide-
al of what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or 
other metaphysical beliefs (i.e. is it permissible to base liberal 
principles on a liberal conception of the good)?
This formula is not satisfactory either, because if it turns out that peo-
ple can converge on general liberal principles from diverse religious and 
philosophical perspectives, there is clearly nothing wrong with their 
doing so. When we talk about “basing” liberal principles on controver-
sial comprehensive doctrines, our concern is not with convergence on 
shared principles (i.e. overlapping consensus), but with specifying prin-
ciples, and making decisions based on these principles, in the context 
of disagreement. The question is what happens when citizens disagree 
about the nature, meaning, scope, or implications of principles of jus-
tice. Is it permissible at that point to advocate and vote for policies that 
one thinks justified according to the true principles, which are based on 
one’s own distinctive conception of the good, even if  others can reason-
ably reject these conceptions? 
We might reformulate Question 1 so as to focus on political decisions:
 1c) Is it permissible to base political decisions on some particular 
ideal of what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or 
other metaphysical beliefs?
Framed in this way, Questions 1 and 2 would not be independent. If po-
litical decisions may never be based on conceptions of the good, then 
the state may not promote conceptions of the good on the grounds of 
their goodness. 10 We want to leave space for a negative answer to the 
first question but a positive answer to the second, yielding political per-
fectionism in one of two forms. First, one might think that although 
10  Comprehensive antiperfectionism would still be a possibility, so long as there 
are ways that conceptions of the good can figure in the justification of decisions that 
do not involve attempts to promote those conceptions, permitting us to answer “yes” 
to Question 1c but “no” to Question 2.
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decisions about some class of basic political rules such as basic rights 
and liberties must not draw upon conceptions of the good, it is per-
missible to promote conceptions of the good so long as one does so in 
ways that do not violate these rules. Second, one might think that al-
though political decisions may not draw upon controversial concep-
tions of the good, they may draw upon claims about the good that are 
not reasonably contestable. To allow for these positions, we should re-
formulate Question 1 so as to focus on decisions about basic matters, 
and we should indicate that both questions can be asked with respect to 
conceptions of the good in general, or just reasonably contestable ones.
 1d) Is it permissible to base decisions about basic political rules (e.g. 
basic liberties) on (reasonably contestable) claims about what 
constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or other (rea-
sonably contestable) metaphysical beliefs?
 2b) Is it permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage some 
activities, ideals, or ways of life on (reasonably contestable) 
grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or on the 
basis of other (reasonably contestable) metaphysical claims? 
Because each question now embeds two separate questions, depending 
on whether or not one includes the “reasonably contestable” limitation, 
there are now more than 4 possibilities, but for simplicity’s sake I will 
persist in using a 2 x 2 framework.  Taking into  account these revisions, 
clarifications, and simplifications, and  allowing for some abbreviation, 
we have the following possibilities:
Question 1: May decisions about basic policies be 
based on (controversial) conceptions of the good?
Yes No
Question 2: May 
the state promote 
(controversial) 
conceptions of the 
good on the grounds 
of their goodness?
Yes Comprehensive Perfectionism Political Perfectionism
No Comprehensive Antiperfectionism
Political Antiperfectionism 
(aka Political Liberalism)
With these modifications, the two questions are once again independent.
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3. Two Kinds of Comprehensive Antiperfectionism
With this exercise in classification out of the way, I want to turn to 
Quong’s critique of comprehensive antiperfectionism (CAP). CAP 
maintains (in my formulation) that decisions about our basic rights and 
liberties may be based on a liberal conception of the good, but that the 
state may not promote conceptions of the good (at least not on grounds 
of their goodness). The tradition Quong has in mind here runs from 
Mill through Dworkin to Kymlicka, particularly as Kymlicka is inter-
preted by Hurka. If autonomous individuality is crucial to leading a 
good life, but otherwise there are lots of different good lives to lead, 
concretely specified, and if the state must act via general rules backed 
by coercion based on limited information, and if valuable activities 
don’t make make someone’s life go better unless that person recognizes 
and endorses their value11, then the best rule of thumb for state action 
may be a policy of neutrality with respect to conceptions of the good. 
According to this way of thinking, the fundamental criterion for assess-
ing the exercise of political power is the promotion of human flourish-
ing, but because the truth about human flourishing is liberal, then, at 
least as a general rule, we can best promote human flourishing by not 
trying to. The state should remain neutral between specific conceptions 
of the good, limiting itself to enforcing individual rights and securing 
the other social conditions that permit people to formulate and pursue 
their own view of the good life – and this, all because of the truth of the 
liberal claim about the importance of autonomy and / or individuality. 
Quong argues that comprehensive antiperfectionism cannot yield a 
consistent antiperfectionism.12 He illustrates his case with the  example 
of Mike and Sara, who disagree about the value of recreational drug 
use, and hence also about whether it should be legally permitted. Mike 
11  Even if theatre is better than monster trucks, my life isn’t improved by attending 
the theatre if I just sleep or grumble my way through the show, without seeing the 
point of it all. Kymlicka calls this the “endorsement constraint;” Will Kymlicka, Con-
temporary Political Philosophy : An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 
203-04. It is a kind of feasibility constraint; use of coercion to promote ways of life 
that are truly valuable may be futile or backfire, because of the need for endorsement.
12  Quong says that he doesn’t directly confront comprehensive antiperfectionism, 
apart from a few brief pages in Chapter 1 (22-25). However, it seems to me that Chap-
ter 3’s critique of paternalism applies to comprehensive antiperfectionism as well 
as to comprehensive perfectionism. Chapter 3 argues that all attempts to promote 
conceptions of the good on the grounds of their goodness involve an objectionable 
element of paternalism. If we assume that comprehensive antiperfectionism à la Mill 
and Dworkin isn’t strictly antiperfectionist, however, then Chapter 3’s argument that 
perfectionism involves paternalism also applies to comprehensive antiperfectionism.
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thinks not, because he believes that seeking pleasure via intoxication is 
a perversion of human nature. Sara believes drug use should be permit-
ted because she rejects Mike’s perfectionism. If she bases her rejection 
of perfectionism on the value of autonomy, however, she runs into trou-
ble. If she says that the reason it is wrong to coerce someone for his own 
good “has to do with autonomy, the importance of being the author of 
your own decisions and your own life” (23), Mike will deny that auto-
nomy is so important that it always trumps other considerations. Sara 
can insist that autonomy really is always more important, but Mike will 
claim that she is drawing on a controversial view of the good, just like 
he is. Since it is grounded in the goal of promoting a controversial liber-
al conception of human flourishing, comprehensive antiperfectionism 
can’t coherently object to the perfectionism of views that aim to pro-
mote other conceptions of human flourishing; at best, it can claim that 
they are promoting the wrong conception of the good. “Sara’s objection 
to the criminalization of drug use is no less perfectionist than Mike’s 
judgment in favour of criminalization,” Quong concludes.
Furthermore, even if Mike were persuaded that autonomy is more im-
portant, with respect to the legal permissibility of drug use, he would 
insist that autonomy is not the only value state policy ought to promote. 
Comprehensive antiperfectionism must permit pluralistic, non-coercive 
promotion of good lives, since such promotion will not undermine peo-
ple’s autonomy (25). This kind of liberal perfectionism still involves ob-
jectionable paternalism, which Quong regards as involving disrespect 
for people’s status as free and equal moral persons (100-6). The label 
“comprehensive antiperfectionism” ends up being misleading, because 
the state ends up acting for controversial perfectionist reasons any way, 
in so far as it is committed to autonomy, and it is permitted to act per-
fectionistically with respect to other aspects of the good, so long as it 
does so in ways that don’t undermine autonomy, e.g. via taxes and sub-
sidies. Quong acknowledges that his criticisms target a specific form of 
CAP, not the family as a whole, but nonetheless concludes that his argu-
ment “suggests that comprehensive liberalism cannot yield a consistent 
anti-perfectionism” (25). This is the first main claim I want to challenge. 
Quong effectively traces the limits of the consequentialist form of com-
prehensive liberalism. There is an alternate, deontological form of com-
prehensive liberalism, however. This kind of comprehensive liberalism 
denies that it is ever just to use the state to promote one reasonably 
contestable conception of the good over another simply on the grounds 
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that the people who accept the correct conception will lead better lives. 
Yet it insists that when it comes to determining what rights and du-
ties individuals have with respect to one another, as a matter of justice, 
we may appeal to conceptions of human flourishing. Once someone 
has passed a minimal threshold of cognitive and practical capacity, we 
must respect the choices they make about how their own lives should 
go, even when these choices are wrongheaded, rather than trying to sec-
ond-guess them, substituting our judgment for theirs about what is af-
ter all their life. However, when it comes to determining what we owe 
each other – what rights and duties people have, how to define “harm,” 
how to set the metric of distributive justice, or the boundaries of mor-
al status – we should aim at the truth full stop, without qualification or 
limitation by any principle of unanimous reasonable acceptability. For 
example, to identify an appropriate scheme of basic liberties, we would 
normally make judgments about the relative importance of the different 
opportunities that different schemes will make available, or preclude – 
that is, we would do so if we were not restricted by a principle of public 
justifiability. Similarly, to determine what the relevant metric of equal-
ity is, in debates about social justice, we would normally need to know 
what resources are necessary for leading a good life. There is a crucial 
difference between deciding what is just on the basis of views about 
the good life, and deciding what is just so as to promote the adoption 
of those views. Not only does the latter view involves an objectionable 
form of paternalism, it subordinates the fundamental value of justice 
to a quite different goal, which is maximizing aggregate human excel-
lence, or perfection. The suggestion that we should define “justice” to 
as to produce the greatest amount of individual or aggregate excellence 
involves treating the lives of some as mere tools for the achievement of 
greatness on the part of others. Defining justice on the basis of relevant 
claims about the content of human flourishing involves no such subor-
dination of justice to perfection, but simply the insistence that we ought 
to figure out and enact true justice, even if in doing so we make reason-
ably contestable claims about the good.
To illustrate the possibility of deontological comprehensive liberalism, 
let us return to the disagreement between Mike and Sara about recre-
ational drug use. Sara can argue that the reason it is wrong to coerce 
someone for their own good is that it is paternalistic, and disrespects 
another person’s autonomous agency. This reason “has to do with” auto-
nomy, but the claim is not that the state ought to act so as to promote 
human flourishing (which happens to include autonomy as one of its 
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central components). The claim is rather that once a person passes 
some threshold of rational functioning, her choices about her own life 
merit respect, even if they are mistaken and have the consequence that 
her life will be less worthwhile or successful. It is her life, and she ought 
to be able to make her own mistakes; I should not substitute my judg-
ment for hers even if I am right that my judgment is better, because 
her capacity for making choices is good enough such that her judg-
ment merits respect. The claim that Sara’s position is ‘no less perfec-
tionist’ than Mike’s rests on an equivocation between the promotional 
and justificatory senses of perfectionism. Sara’s position is staunchly 
antiperfectionist in the promotional sense, since she denies that it is 
legitimate to use political power to promote controversial conceptions 
of human flourishing, just because the people who end up adopting 
these ways of life will thereby lead better lives. Sara is strongly opposed 
to paternalism, particularly when coercive, but also when non-coercive 
(for, as Quong rightly argues, paternalism can exist without limitation 
of liberty).13 Sara’s position is justified on the basis of reasonably reject-
able claims about the value of autonomy, however, and about the prop-
er form of our relationship to this value (respect, not promotion). This 
second, merely justificatory sense of perfectionism does not necessarily 
involve any taint of paternalism. Sara thinks that justice forbids pater-
nalism (once people pass the threshold of cognitive and psychological 
capacity), but acknowledges that this claims depends upon controver-
sial claims about the good. Drawing on controvesial conceptions of the 
good in this way, in order to identify and specify the rights and duties 
we have as a matter of justice, does not in any way legitimate perfection-
ist imposition of controversial conceptions of the good. We identify jus-
tice based on claims about the good; we do not define “justice” so as to 
promote the favoured conception. 
Later Quong labels this kind of position as “perfectionist justice” (29; 
see also 85).14 He argues that theories of perfectionist justice cannot 
“practically distinguish” themselves from non-perfectionist theories. 
13  Quong offers the following example of an option-expanding but paternalistic 
offer: “My girlfriend asks me whether I will finish that conference paper I am meant 
to be working on this afternoon or succumb to temptation and watch the football 
match instead? I assure her I am perfectly capable of applying myself to work this 
afternoon, but she does not believe me, and so offers to take me out to my favourite 
restaurant (which she dislikes and generally would not go to) as an incentive to make 
sure I sue my afternoon appropriately” (75).
14  He calls perfectionist justice a “stronger” thesis, noting that contemporary 
perfectionists are typically committed to the “weaker” thesis that regardless of 
how principles of justice are derived, perfectionist reasoning constitutes legitimate 
LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION
25
He makes this argument with respect to principles of distributive jus-
tice. Quong provides two different statements of the perfectionist posi-
tion on distributive justice:
 1) “[Th]e metric or currency of distributive justice must be defined 
by reference to perfectionist considerations” (85).
 2) “[E]ach person’s fair share of resources or advantage should be 
determined by how much each person needs to flourish to the 
appropriate degree, as specified by the correct conception of the 
good life” (122). 
The first defines perfectionism about distributive justice as the view 
that the metric of distribution depends on reasonably rejectable claims 
about human flourishing; the second adds that shares should depend 
on individual needs, so as to achieve equal levels of flourishing. Quong 
thus says that perfectionist justice “will distribute resources unequal-
ly in order to give each person the amount they need to achieve the 
same level of flourishing, whereas the non-perfectionist theory mere-
ly aims at an equal distribution of resources (122-3). Equality of flour-
ishing must be both plausible and remain distinct from equality of re-
sources in its practical implications, Quong claims, if it is to constitute 
a real alternative. Quong denies that it can be both (123-26). I agree 
with Quong’s criticisms of the principle of equality of flourishing, but 
don’t think they tell against perfectionism about justice. We ought to 
set aside once and for all the sleight of hand Dworkin used to define 
equality of resources. Those who reject neutrality and think that the 
question of human flourishing is relevant to the principle of distribu-
tive justice do not believe in enforcing equality of flourishing regardless 
of the choices people make, any more than Dworkin believed in equal-
ity of resources regardless of the choices people make.15 Dworkin’s met-
ric was defined in terms of the total amount of resources devoted to a 
grounds for political action (30). However it is not clear why one is stronger than the 
other, as opposed to just being different. 
15  Arneson argued that there are two independent distinctions: “(1) straight equal-
ity versus equal opportunity and (2) welfare versus resources as the appropriate basis 
for measuring distributive shares.” I would simply add that we should also consider 
human flourishing, objectively characterized, as well as effective functioning as a 
citizen under question 2. Arneson goes on to point out that given his two binary 
questions there are four positions to consider. “On the issue of whether an egalitar-
ian should regard welfare or resources as the appropriate standard of distributive 
equality, it is important to compare like with like, rather than, for instance, just to 
compare equal opportunity for resources with straight equality of welfare.” Dwor-
kin’s “What is Equality?” is “marred,” Arneson says by “a failure to being these four 
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person’s whole life, as determined by the prices generated by all of the 
choices they and everyone else make in an ideal market.16 A more per-
spicuous formulation of his position would be “equal opportunity to 
acquire resources as defined by everyone’s aggregate preferences.”17 Per-
fectionists can agree that justice requires equal opportunity, not equal-
ity of outcome, but they believe that the relevant opportunity is oppor-
tunity to flourish, as defined by an objective account of well-being, not 
equal opportunity to obtain resources as defined by average preferenc-
es. The fundamental question highlighted by the p.85 definition but not 
the p.122 and 123 definitions is how we determine the metric of distribu-
tive justice: resources as identified by aggregate preferences (Dworkin), 
resources necessary for exercise and development of capacities of free 
and equal citizens (Rawls), or resources necessary for human flourish-
ing. The perfectionist position may be wrong, but it is a legitimate con-
tender, and it is practically distinct.
4. Political Perfectionism
According to political perfectionism, decisions about basic political 
rules e.g. rights and liberties may not be based on reasonably contesta-
ble conceptions of the good life, but they may be made based on claims 
about the good that are not reasonably contestable, and / or the state 
may promote conceptions of the good even if reasonably contestable, 
so long as it does so in ways that respect these basic rules, e.g. within 
the scope permitted by basic liberties.18 LWP offers two responses to 
distinct positions clearly into focus” Richard Arneson, “Equality and Equal Oppor-
tunity for Welfare,” Philosophical Studies 56 (1989), 88.
16  R. M. Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 10, no. 4 (1981), 307, 310.
17  Elizabeth Anderson points out that the difference between welfare and resource 
egalitarians does not consist in the fact that one attributes a role to subjective prefer-
ences and the other does not. “They differ only in that for welfare egalitarians, the 
claims a person makes are dependent on her tastes, whereas for resource egalitar-
ians, they are a function of everyone’s tastes” Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point 
of Equality?,” Ethics 109, no. 2 (1999), 295. On this account, Rawls would not count as 
a resource egalitarian, since his social primary goods are not defined in terms of pref-
erences at all, but based on what is necessary to function as a free and equal citizen.
18  See, for example, Taylor’s discussion of two kinds of liberalism in his essay “Shared 
and Divergent Values,” Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian 
Federalism and Nationalism (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), 156-
86. Taylor distinguishes a bad, American form of liberalism based on neutrality, which 
he associates with Dworkin, and then a good, capacious form of liberalism that per-
mits pursuit of collective (perfectionist) goals within the constraints of basic individ-
ual rights. If Taylor accepts that our basic rights and liberties must be identified and 
justified based on a limited set of public reasons rather than on the basis of specific 
religious doctrines, then the gap between Taylor and Rawls is very small. 
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political perfectionism. First, even if some goods are reasonably non-re-
jectable, state promotion of them will involve paternalism and / or un-
equal treatment, and so will be wrong even if not a violation of any basic 
liberty. That health and pleasure are good other things equal is not rea-
sonably rejectable, let’s assume; still, one might think that it would be 
paternalistic for the state to discourage smoking on grounds that smok-
ers are making a mistake about the relative importance of health and 
pleasure.19 Quong’s discussion of paternalism merits a longer discus-
sion. Here, I want to limit myself to questioning the role that the prin-
ciple of public justification plays in this argument. Even if we accept 
that it is paternalistic for the state to promote one ranking of reasona-
bly-non-rejectable goods over another simply because this is the correct 
ranking and people’s lives would go better if they adopted this ranking, 
it is not the principle of public justification that is doing the work in this 
case. The problem with the policy of discouraging smoking on grounds 
that health is more important than pleasure is not that it is animated 
by non-public reasons, values or convictions that some people will not 
unreasonably view as being fundamentally alien. The problem that the 
policy is paternalistic. 
To illustrate the fact that the demand for public justification goes be-
yond the rejection of paternalism, I would point out that not all an-
ti-smoking laws based on an assessment of the relative importance of 
smoking and pleasure are paternalistic.20 Judgments about the relative 
importance of health and pleasure can figure in justifications of deci-
sions about social policy in two ways: as the object of promotion, or as 
the basis for determining the scope of the rights and duties we have as 
a matter of justice. Consider the question of the boundaries of our duty 
not to harm, in relation to second-hand smoke. On the one side of the 
debate, we have the legitimate concern of protecting people’s health 
from the harmful effects of other people’s smoking. On the other side 
of the debate, we have the legitimate concern that others take pleasure 
in smoking. If the latter did not count as a public reason, we could sim-
ply ban smoking across the board. That we do not do so suggests that 
19  On this point, see Daniel Weinstock’s case for mildly coercive policies intended 
to discourage smoking, and Gerald Gaus’ critical response Daniel M. Weinstock, 
“Neutralizing Perfection: Hurka on Liberal Neutrality,” Dialogue 38 (1999), 55; Ger-
ald F. Gaus, “Liberal Neutrality: A Compelling and Radical Principle,” in Perfection-
ism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory, ed. Stephen Wall, and George Klosko 
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., 2003), 157-58.
20  This paragraph draws on Andrew Lister Public Reason and Political Community 
(Bloomsbury, 2013), Chapter 2, Section 3.
PUBLIC REASON AND PERFECTIONISMANdREW LISTER
28
we think that the fact that some people like to smoke deserves some 
weight, in our decision about where to draw the boundaries of the right 
to smoke (airplanes? restaurants? doorways to buildings? patios?). Un-
less restricted in scope, the principle of public justification rules out ap-
peals to controversial conceptions of the good in decisions about such 
policies, even though they are not paternalistic.
It might be said that the value on the other side of the equation is not 
pleasure but simply liberty. Yet liberty as such, in the descriptive sense 
(absence of moral obligation or legal duty to refrain from doing X) does 
not have a fixed value, independent of what “X” is. Other things equal, 
liberty should be the default, I grant. But if “X” = murdering my neigh-
bour, then this liberty has no moral value. Second-hand smoke is a long 
way from murder, of course. But the the bare, pro tanto value of lack of 
restriction is not going to answer the question of how important the lib-
erty to smoke is, when it comes at the expense of harm, or risk of harm, 
to others. In setting the boundaries of people’s liberties, so as to make 
them consistent, we must draw upon judgments about the urgency of 
the various interests people have. Measurements of liberty will depend 
on qualitative assessments of the significance of the opportunities peo-
ple have available to them, and will therefore normally depend upon 
judgments about the good, unless reasonably contestable and hence ex-
cluded by the principle of public justifiability. The case for exclusion of 
reasonably contestable conceptions of the good with respect to “per-
fectionist justice” cannot piggyback on the strength of the case against 
paternalism.
Even if one can be an anti-paternalist without accepting public justi-
fication (as my earlier discussion of the deontological variant of com-
prehensive antiperfectionism was meant to show), it may be that the 
principle of public justification provides a plausible reason for reject-
ing paternalism. If all or nearly all conceptions of the good are reason-
ably rejectable, public reason would by itself rule out all or nearly all 
perfectionism (unless its scope of application were restricted). The idea 
that no conceptions of the good will be agreed upon by all reasonable 
persons is certainly true if one takes “conception of the good” to re-
fer to a body of evaluative or philosophical claims that forms a whole, 
one whose adherents consciously identify it as a system, or in other 
words a philosophy of life. Reasonable unanimity that one such sys-
tem is best is extremely unlikely. As Joseph Chan has argued, however, 
it is more plausible to think that there can be reasonable unanimity on 
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single, local judgments about the value of particular activities or rela-
tionships.21 A life involving friends, family, and meaningful work is bet-
ter than a life of loneliness and drudgery. Such judgments might pass 
the test of qualified acceptability, and thus constitute a legitimate basis 
for political decision-making, it seems. 
Quong offers a partial response to this objection in his answer to what 
he calls the “asymmetry” objection, in Chapter 7. If reasonable disa-
greement about the good life makes conceptions of the good illegiti-
mate as reasons for state action, why does reasonable disagreement 
about justice not make conceptions of justice illegitimate as the basis 
for state action?22 One answer would be that there is no reasonable dis-
agreement about justice, but the view that there is this sharp episte-
mological asymmetry between the right and the good is implausible. 
Quong’s response is to distinguish fundamental from non-fundamental 
or “justificatory” disagreement, and to argue that reasonable disagree-
ment about justice is necessarily justificatory, while disagreement about 
the good life is “almost certainly” going to be foundational (193). To il-
lustrate the distinction, Quong contrasts Mike and Sara’s debate about 
the morality of recreational drug use, which is foundational, with Sara’s 
disagreement with Tony about discrimination, which is justificatory, or 
non-foundational (205). The question at stake between Sara and Tony 
is whether the Catholic Church should be allowed to hire only male 
priests. Tony thinks it should, because it is a private, voluntary asso-
ciation. Sara believes that it should not, because private organizations 
have to respect all kinds of laws, and nondiscrimination in hiring is just 
one of these. This disagreement is non-foundational because Sara and 
Tony accept a range of reasons that they agree are relevant to the case at 
hand, but simply interpret or apply them differently. They conceive of 
society as a fair scheme of cooperation between free and equal persons, 
they recognize the burdens of judgment and reasonable pluralism, they 
accept the principle of public justification, and so on. They arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions about the application of shared reasons in specific 
(perhaps disputed) factual circumstances, but these judgments do not 
count as non-public, in Quong’s (and Rawls’s) view. Public justifiability 
21  Chan, “Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism,” 13-14.
22  Many people have made this objection, but see in particular Michael Sandel, 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 202-10 and Simon Caney, “Liberal Legitimacy, Reasonable Disagree-
ment and Justice,” in Pluralism and Liberal Neutrality, ed. Richard Bellamy, and Mar-
tin Hollis (Illford, Essex: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999).
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requires that we make political decisions based on public reasons, not 
that the decision to put in place a common rule be invulnerable to rea-
sonable rejection. Thus if Sara thinks that the balance of public reasons 
favours a broader antidiscrimination law and Tony a narrower antidis-
crimination law they may each advocate and vote for their preferred po-
sition, despite the fact that each conclusion (about where the balance 
of public reasons lies) is reasonably rejectable. Quong is not applying 
the idea of qualified acceptability to state action directly with a default 
of inaction, but to general reasons for political decisions, with a default 
of exclusion, and the stipulation that judgments about the application, 
interpretation, and ranking of public reasons do not necessarily count 
as non-public.
The main question about this argument is why reasonable disagree-
ments about the good life don’t get to qualify as justificatory in the same 
way that reasonable disagreements about justice count as justificatory, 
which is to say by definition. Reasonable disagreements about justice 
are justificatory because if they weren’t they wouldn’t count as reason-
able. To qualify as reasonable, disagreements about justice must be dis-
agreements between intellectual positions that accept the basic beliefs 
or values that are criterial for reasonableness, and they must accept the 
principle of public justifiability itself. Reasonable disagreements about 
justice are non-foundational because if they were foundational, they 
would involve appeal to non-public reasons, contrary to the principle 
of public justifiability, acceptance of which is necessary for reasonable-
ness. Reasonable disagreements about justice are therefore necessarily 
– by definition – disagreements about the interpretation, application, 
and ranking of public reasons. Why can’t we make the same argument 
about reasonable disagreements about the good? Reasonable points of 
view share the commitment to public justification. Therefore any disa-
greements about the good that arise in the course of political delibera-
tion must be disagreements about the interpretation or application of 
shared views about the good. Consider the case of Sara and Matthew. 
Sara and Matthew agree that autonomy is an important aspect of the 
good life. For this reason Sara thinks that recreational drug use should 
be legal. Matthew disagrees, on the grounds that some recreational 
drug use compromises autonomy, because it generates addiction, and 
reduces people’s powers of reasoning. Matthew and Sara are not having 
a foundational disagreement, it seems to me, but a justificatory disa-
greement – a non-foundational disagreement about the good.
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But autonomy is controversial, some will say; it is not invulnerable to 
reasonable rejection, and it is not simply an interpretation of some 
meaningfully shared higher-order value that is invulnerable to reason-
able rejection. For some definitions of autonomy, this is true. Suppose 
I claim that what gives human beings their dignity, raising us above an-
imals and giving us a special place in the universe, is our ability to act 
for reasons rather than on mere impulse, and that we must accept no 
beliefs or commitments as valid reasons except those that we have sub-
jected to critical scrutiny, and that I must consider myself my own final 
 authority on what counts as a reason. I take it that many religious peo-
ple will reject this view. Yet if what is at stake is just the claim that it is 
bad to become addicted to crack cocaine, because (among other things) 
this undermines one’s ability to recognize and act on reasons, it seems 
to me that there is no reasonable disagreement. To be sure, there is 
disagreement about whether it is more important to respect or protect 
/ promote autonomy, and about the importance of autonomy relative 
to other values. But such disagreement could be seen as disagreement 
about the interpretation and application of a shared value.
Autonomy in this weak sense is not the only value reasonable views 
share. Friendship is good; music is good. I grant that it is not unreason-
able to be a hermit, who enjoys solitude and silence. Yet the reasona-
bleness of this choice doesn’t undermine the claim that it is unreason-
able to deny that friendship and music have value, and are pro tanto 
goods (relationships or activities that make a life go better, in a consti-
tutive sense, other things equal). There are, I take it, lots of values one 
could realize in one’s life. Yet no one can realize all values, and some 
people can’t realize specific values, because of their emotional and psy-
chological make-up. Moreover, there may be values whose realization 
precludes the realization of other values. These ethical commonplaces 
mean that reasonable choice of one activity or way of life over anoth-
er need not involve any disagreement with the claim that other activi-
ties or ways of life are good, and have value. Perhaps there are special 
states of consciousness available only to those who isolate themselves 
from others in order to commune with nature; perhaps a commitment 
to great art requires a single-minded devotion that is incompatible with 
family and friendship. It would nonetheless be unreasonable to main-
tain that friendship is not a good. 
In order to establish the necessary asymmetry between the right and 
the good, Quong would have to argue that we have no way of knowing 
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for sure whether any particular claim about the good is not reasonably 
rejectable, whereas we know for sure that some claims about justice are 
not reasonably rejectable. The reason for this asymmetry is that the idea 
of reasonableness is constructed out of specific kinds of ideas – that 
of society as a scheme of cooperation between free and equal persons, 
for example. Whether all reasonable persons agree that friendship is a 
good is an empirical question, a question that can only be answered by 
canvassing the beliefs of all reasonable points of view. But they neces-
sarily accept that persons are free and equal, because otherwise they 
wouldn’t count as reasonable. Suppose all presently existing reasonable 
doctrines accept that friendship is a good; still, we don’t know that all 
must, not for sure, whereas we do know that all reasonable doctrines 
accept free and equal citizenship, because we have made such accept-
ance one of the criteria for being counted as reasonable. The asymmetry 
between the right and the good in political liberalism is definitional, a 
matter of construction rather than a discovery, so to speak. 
Whether or not the definitional nature of the asymmetry between 
the right and the good is a problem for Quong’s political liberalism, 
I am not sure. The issue depends on who we should count as reason-
able, or otherwise qualified, which in turn depends on why we should 
care about qualified acceptability of our reasons for political decisions. 
These kinds of question are always tricky to answer for a political liber-
al because ‘the’ justification of political liberalism must always at some 
point rest on (convergent) non-public grounds, as Quong’s argument 
about the internal conception and overlapping consensus shows. My 
own view is that public justification makes possible a relationship of 
civic friendship across deep moral disagreement. I don’t think Quong 
would disagree, but he would I think insist that public justification is in 
the first instance a condition of legitimacy or justice, not simply a mat-
ter of political community.
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Endrju Lister
Javni um i perfekcionizam:  
komentari na Kvongovu knjigu Liberalizam bez savršenstva
Apstrakt
Liberalizam bez savršenstva razrađuje opšte Rolsovsko shvatanje javnog 
opravdanja sa svrhom odbrane antiperfekcionističkog liberalizma. Ovaj 
kritički odgovor postavlja pitanja o vezi između dva dela projekta. S jedne 
strane, moguće je odbiti zahtev da razlozi za političke odluke prođu kvalifi-
kovani zahtev prihvatanja, čak i ako je neko striktno protivan u odnosu na 
paternalizam. S druge strane, zalaganje za javno opravdanje ne obara svaki 
perfekcionizam, ako postoje neki zahtevi o dobru koji se ne mogu razlož-
no odbijati. 
Ključne reči: Liberalizam, politički liberalizam, javni um, javno  opravdanje, 
neutralnost.
